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The Second Circuit's decision in the instant case was hailed as spawning a
new breed of inside information cases. 2 Together with recent decisions limiting the scope of class actions in inside information cases, 63 the Florida supreme
court's decision proves those predictions premature. As a result, the extent of
liability for tippee trading is severely, though justifiably, curtailed. What liability remains, absent a showing of prearranged scheme of tippee trading,
exists at the federal level.6 4 Even there, however, a significant reconsideration
of tippee liability is in progress, and it seems probable that a policy more in
line with that of the instant decision will be developed. 65
ALAN RAINEY

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DOES NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
ENCOMPASS FEDERAL PROPRIETARY RIGHTS
IN THE MARGINAL SEA?*
United States v. Maine, 95 S.Ct. 1155 (1975)
Invoking the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court,' the
federal government brought suit for a declaration of its exclusive rights as
national sovereign in the waters, seabed, and subsoil contiguous to the territorial seas 2 of defendants, the Atlantic coastal states.3 The federal government
62. BRODSKY, supra note 5, at 104.
63. Id. at 104, 129.
64. Id. at 83. "The SEC has been campaigning against delinquent insider trading reports
and increasing its use of computers to flush out insider trading based upon non-public information. It has also been pursuing inside information cases on a priority basis, including
references to the Department of Justice."
65. See, e.g., SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), ef. In re Investors
Management Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1178,163, at 80,519-20 (1971). See also Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Enrrog's NoTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the Summer 1975 quarter.
1. U.S. Const. art. 1I1, §2, cl.
2: "In all Cases .. . in which a state shall be Party, the supreme Court (sic) shall have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. §1251(b) (1970) grants the Court
competence: "The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of ... (2)
All controversies between the United States and a State."
2. See generally Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1301(a)(2) (1970), wherein the United
States Congress defined that land which it granted to the states as "all lands permanently or
periodically covered by tidal waters up to but not above the line of mean high tide and seaward to a line three geographical miles distant from the coast line of each such State and to
the boundary line of each such State where in any case such boundary as it existed at the
time such State became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by Congress, extends seaward . . .beyond three geographical miles." For purposes of this comment, "territorial seas," as well as "marginal seas," shall represent the waters existing above the land described in §1301(a)(2).
3. Connecticut alone, of all the states bordering the Atlantic, was not made a defendant
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contended that these rights inhered in its capacity as national sovereign and
that, historically, such rights were first exercised by the federal government. In
refutation, the states asserted that the governmental rights inherent in national
sovereignty did not preclude the exercise of proprietary rights in the contested
region by the states and that the historical assertions of the federal government
were erroneous. Rejecting the contention by the states that they are constitutionally vested with exclusive proprietary rights to the disputed territory, the
Supreme Court HELD, the rights of the national sovereign implicitly encompass proprietary interests in the waters, seabed, and subsoil beyond the terri4
torial seas of the states.
A nation legally exercises both governmental sovereignty and proprietary
ownership in the marginal sea contiguous to its coast.5 The preliminary issue
with which the Court was confronted was whether these rights of sovereignty
and ownership inhered in the original thirteen colonies upon their secession
from Britain or were reposed in an indefinite national union yet to be legally
constituted. The Court concluded that the original colonies did not separately
achieve complete sovereignty upon their successful revolt against the British
Commonwelath, 6 accepting the argument that sovereignty passed directly from
the British Crown to a composite national government that manifested its existence in the activities of the Continental Congress. 7 Supporting a contrary
because of the United States determination that Long Island Sound is an inland waterway.
Thus the application of the concept of "territorial seas" to Connecticut would be improper.
See note 2 supra. The claim against defendant Florida was severed and decided independently.
95 S. Ct. at 1157 n.3. Florida claimed that the congressional act of June 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 73,
recognized boundaries of the state inconsistent with plaintiff's contentions in the instant case.
Florida's claims were disallowed. United States v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 1162 (1975).
4. 95 S. Ct. 1155 (1975).
5. This concept had been developing for over 500 years when the first American patriots
foreswore allegiance to the English Crown. See S. SWARZTRAUBER, THE THREE-MILE LIMI'T OF
TERRITORIAL SEAS 11 (1972), where the author notes that as early as 1269 Venice demanded
and received fees from all vessels sailing in the Adriatic; S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING T'HERETO 376 (3d Ed. 1888), reprinting HALE, DE JURE -MARIS
(1667): "The narrow sea, adjoining to the coast of England, is part of the wast and demesnes
and dominions of the king of England, whether it lie within the body of any county or
In this sea the king of England hath a double right, viz. a right of jurisdiction
not ....
which he ordinarily exerciseth by his admiral, and a right of propriety or ownership.";

E.

BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY 11 (1953), quoting

J.

ANGELL, RIGHT OF PROP-

ERTY IN TIDEWATERS 17-18 (1826): "To the King, therefore, is not only assigned the sovereign
dominion over the sea adjoining the coasts, and over the arms of the sea; but in him is also
vested the right of property in the soil thereof." (emphasis in original).
6. 95 S. Ct. at 1158, quoting United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 31 (1947).
7. In regard to the instant case, see Special Master's Report at 60-65, United States v.
Maine, 95 S. Ct. 1155 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Special Master's Report]. Cf. Justice Sutherland's arguments in United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), quoting Rufus King
in 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 212: "The states were not 'sovereigns' in the sense contended for by
some. They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty, - they could not make war,
nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties. Considering them as political beings, they were dumb,
for they could not speak to any foreign sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they could
not hear any propositions from such sovereign. They had not even the organs or faculties of
defence or offence, for they could not of themselves raise troops, or equip vessels, for war."
299 U.S. at 317. But see notes 9-11 infra.
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conclusion, the 1782 Preliminary Articles of Peace, which were consummated
between Britain and her former colonial subjects,8 expressly spelled out each
individual state's rights vis-,-vis the English Crown.9 Moreover, the 1783 Definitive Treaty of Peace specifically reiterated the independent nature of each
state's negotiations with the British Empire. 0 The limited national entity that
existed under the Articles of Confederation': in the years 1783-1789 was
specifically prohibited from exercising the right of eminent domain, 12 a right
which historically inhered in sovereignty. Thus, contrary to the instant Court's
conclusion, the formation of a federal union in 1789 was consummated by
sovereign and independent states, which saw fit to create a strong but limited
3
national government.'
Early cases in the United States Supreme Court adjudicated the rights of
states in their inland navigable waters. In 1842 it was held that the result of the
American Revolution was to "place the people of each State... [in a] sovereign
[position] ... and in that character [they] hold the absolute right to all their
8. H. MILLER, TREATIEs AND OTHE INTERNATIONAL AcTs OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
96 (1931).
9. Id. The Articles of Peace specifically state that the borders of the states shall "[comprehend] all Islands within twenty Leagues of any part of the Shores of the united States."
Id. at 9&. Note that in the phrase "united States", "united" is not capitalized, yet "States" is;
this emphasis on the States as the legal entities negotiating with Great Britain could not
have been unintentional. The emphatic implications are: (1) the states had merely "united"
in battle to fight a common enemy; (2) in achieving independence each state gained sovereignty in waters extending twenty leagues (60 miles) into the sea.
10. Id. at 152. Thus, though the 13 colonies engaged in the successful maneuver of uniting to form a common front for purposes of entering battle, each one remained a distinct
legal entity effecting separate recognition of its independence. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 83
and 92 Before the Senate Committee on Public Lands, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 44 (1939) (testimony of Representative Hobbs), cited in E. BARTLEY, supra note 5, at 29 n.ll.
11. The representative body created under this "agreement to cooperate," whose decrees
were voluntarily abided by as each state saw fit, was little more than a sounding board for
divergent views then prevailing along the continent. The Confederatory Congress was aptly
described as a mere "diplomatic body" by John Randolph, later a founder of constitutional
federalism. E. BARTLEY, supra note 5, at 30, citing A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 137 (1905). Cf. Preliminary Articles of Peace, Art. V (1782), where it is stated that the
Confederatory Congress "shall earnestly recommend it to the Legislatures of the respective
States, to provide for the Restitution of all Estates, Rights and Properties which have been
confiscated, belonging to real British Subjects...." H. MILLER, supra note 8, at 98. The Confederatory Congress, therefore, had no power to force the states to abide by such a provision.
Each "sovereign and independent" state could affirm or reject it, as it saw fit. Id. at 96.
Article VII of the Preliminary Articles of Peace provided: "There shall be a firm and
perpetual Peace, between his Britannic Majesty and the said States .... " Id. at 99.
12. E. BARTLEY, supra note 5, at 35, quoting Article IX, Articles of Confederation. Cf.
Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523 (1827), wherein it is concluded that the national
entity which existed under the Articles of Confederation did not own, nor could it acquire,
any territory of its own initiative. Id. at 526.
13. The tenth amendment to the United States Constitution reserves all powers to the
states that are not specifically delegated to the government of the United States. U.S. CONST.
amend. 10. Nowhere within the Constitution is it stated that the states were divested of any
proprietary interests they may have had within their borders. See note 9 supra; E. BARTLEY,
supra note 5, at 35: "[T]here is no delegation [to the national government] of jurisdiction or
title in the soils under [the original states' territorial] waters."
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navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use, subject
only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general government."14 Three years later the Court concluded that the state of Alabama en-

tered the Union upon an "equal footing" 15 with the original states and was
thereby entitled to exercise complete sovereignty over its navigable inland
waterways and the soil beneath them. 16 In a controversy between Massachusetts
and an individual, the Court ruled in 1891 that a state could regulate and protect its fisheries wthin a bay contiguous to its coast' 7 in the absence of congressional action to the contrary.' 8 Likewise, a state was deemed empowered to
exercise police powers within its territorial waters in the absence of conflicting
federal legislation.1 9 In all controversies not involving a dispute between the
federal and state governments, "[t]he maritime belt is . . . under the sway of

the riparian States....
The question of sovereignty in the territorial seas adjacent to a state's coast
first came before the Court in the landmark case of United States v. Californiah2l There the Court concluded that California had no vested property
rights in its territorial seas or the lands submerged beneath them. 22 Rather, the
federal government, incident to its national sovereignty, was properly vested
14. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
15. For an explanation of the legal significance of this phrase, see note 25 infra.
16. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
17. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891).
18. Id. at 266.
19. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 393 (1948); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 75 (1941).
20. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 52 (1905). But see vom Baur, Confiscation by
Judicial Decree: The Procedural Course of the Tidelands Cases, 27 TUL. L. REV. 286 (1953),
where, based upon extensive authority the author concludes: "Prior to the California case,
there seems quite clearly, to have been no so-called 'inland water rule.' The very contrary
was the case, in that the rule started with the sea and worked inland to branches or arms of
the sea with navigability being the test as to whether estuaries, rivers, etc., still partook of the
character of the sea." Id. at 310 n.78; H.R. REP. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), reprinted as Appendix to H.R. REP. No. 215, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (1953), as reported in 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1385 (1953): "For the first time in history the
Court drew a distinction between the legal principles applicable to bays, harbors, sounds, and
other inland waters on the one hand, and to submerged lands Iaying seaward of the lowwater mark on the other, although it appears the Court had ample opportunity to do so in
many previous cases, but failed or refused to draw such distinction. In the California decision the Court refused to apply what it termed 'the old inland water rule' to the submerged coastal lands; however, historically speaking, it seems clear that the rule of State
ownership of inland waters is, in fact, an offshoot of the marginal sea rule established much
earlier." Id. at 1429; Keeton, Federal and State Claims to Submerged Lands Under Coastal
Waters, 25 TEXAs L. Rev. 262 (1947), where the author concludes: "It has been argued and
with much reason that if the states own the submerged land under navigable streams within
its [sic] boundaries, and if the states own the land under navigable streams on their respective borders, then it follows that the states bordering on the sea own the submerged lands off
External sovereignty and authority to regulate with respect
their respective shore lines....
to the use of coastal waters would seem to be no better a basis for ownership of submerged
land than internal sovereignty and authority to regulate with respect to the use of navigable
streams." Id. at 264-65.
21. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
22. Id. at 38.
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with all governmental rights in this three-mile belt of water contiguous to the
state's coast.23 Two reasons were cited by the Court. First, the original thirteen
colonies did not separately acquire ownership in their territorial waters, sea24
bed, or subsoil by virtue of their successful revolution against Britain, so
California could not base its theory of ownership upon the incorporation of
such a right under the "equal footing" doctrine2 5 of the Enabling Act which
admitted it to the Union. 2 6 Second, recognition of a three-mile belt within
which a nation exercises sovereignty was first accomplished by the national
government; therefore, a state's claim to dominion over such an area prior to
27
its admission to the Union is untenable.
In United States v. Louisiana,28 the Court expanded its holding in California to include within federal dominion a band of water extending 24 miles
beyond the territorial seas of Louisiana, claimed by the defendant under a
1989 state statute. 29 In holding that the rationale of its previous decision in
Californiawas controlling, 0 the Court concluded a fortiori that the ocean beyond a state's territorial seas must also be in the national domain.31
3 2
The Supreme Court had yet to specifically decide what proprietary rights,
as opposed to the political right to implement governmental interests in the

23. Id. at 35. Note that the Court in California did not decide that the federal government is vested with all proprietary rights in the contested area. Justice Frankfurter recognized the relevance of this point in his dissent: "It is significant that the Court does not
adopt the Government's elaborate argument . . . that this part of the open sea belongs, in a
proprietary sense, to the United States ....
Instead, the Court finds trespass against the
United States on the basis of what it calls the 'national dominion' by the United States over
this area." 332 U.S. at 43. Yet the result for California is the same since, by the Court's
holding, it cannot extract material from the submerged land of its territorial waters.
24. 332 U.S. at 31. But see text accompanying notes 9-13, supra.
25. Upon a state's admission to the Union "she at once [becomes] entitled to and
possessed of all the rights of dominion and sovereignty which belonged to the original
States . ... " Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 546 (1886). For a concise history of this doctrine
see Comment, Conflicting State and Federal Claims of Title in Submerged Lands of the Continental Shelf, 56 YALE L.J. 356, 358 n.15 (1947). Were the "equal footing" doctrine applied
in concert with the conclusions reached in notes 9-11 supra, state ownership would result.
26. 332 U.S. at 30, citing 9 Stat. 452.
27. Secretary 'of State Jefferson's assertion of a minimal three-mile limit in official correspondence with the British and French Ministers was solely concerned with ships of those
natibns violating American neutrality by entering United States ports. Any reference to
proprietary rights or domestic federal-state relations is conspicuously absent. For the history
and text of these notes, see S. SwAPzrAUBER, supra note 5, at 56. But see text accompanying

notes 9-13, supra. Though a three-mile. belt may not have been recognized per se by 1789,
when the states formed the national Union, the independent nation-states had the same
rights of sovereignty in the waters contiguous to their shores as did all other nations in that
time period. See note 5 supra.
28. 339 U.S. 699 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., wrote separate opinion recorded in United States
v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 723).

29.

6 LA. GEN. STATs. §§9311.1-.4 (1939).

30. 339 U.. at 704.
31. Id. -at 705. The reasoning behind the Court's decision was as follows: "The ocean
seaward of the marginal belt is perhaps even more directly related to the national defense,
the conduct of foreign affairs, and world commerce than is the marginal sea." Id.
32. See note 23 supra.
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territorial waters, were vested in the federal government. In 1950 the Court
reached this issue in United States v. Texas. 33 There Texas was adjudged to
have no right of ownership, in either the proprietary or political sense, over
the waters contiguous to its coastline or beyond 34 despite its unique status as an
independent republic 35 prior to admission to the Union. 36 This was so, the
Court concluded, because the "equal footing" clause worked to limit as well as
expand the rights of a newly-admitted state. Since neither California nor
Louisiana could exercise rights incident to ownership of their territorial seas or
the waters beyond, Texas was precluded from doing so as wellA'
In the quarter century since the Court's decision in Texas the financial impact of resource extraction from the submerged lands composing the Continental Shelf has been staggering. In 1953, a congressional committee felt confident in utilizing a Geological Survey estimate of 15.156 billion barrels as
comprising the total United States offshore oil reserves.38 Reliable 1968 estimates of potentially recoverable crude oil in the outer continental shelf indicated 165 billion barrels, 39 eleven times the 1953 estimate. Considering the
$11.60 per barrel price of refined oil4o as of June 5, 1975, the magnitude of the
financial stake is obvious. Of great significance to the states is the amount in
royalties that the federal government presently receives from those who extract
the oil from the offshore seabed. As of 1974, the Department of Interior collected a royalty of 16.67 percent 4' of the value of the total amount of oil pro33. 339 U.S. 707 (1950) (Reed, Minton, JJ., dissented; Frankfurter, J., wrote a separate
opinion) (decided on the same day as United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699).
34. Id. at 719. But see Justice Reed's dissent: "The necessity for the United States to defend the land and to handle international affairs is not enough to transfer property rights in
the marginal sea from Texas to the United States. Federal sovereignty is paramount within
national boundaries, but federal ownership depends on taking possession . . . on consent ...
or on purchase." Id. at 723 (Minton, J., concurring in dissent).
35. The United States conceded that Texas, as an independent Republic, was entitled to
complete sovereignty with respect to her territorial waters and beyond. 339 U.S. at 717.
36. 339 U.S. at 717. Under previously outlined history, see note 5 supra, the Republic of
Texas would have to be recognized as having sovereignty in its territorial waters. Even under
the federal government's analysis, which concluded that a three-mile belt was first specifically
recognized in 1793, see text accompanying note 27 supra, it would be undeniable that Texas
entered the Union with complete sovereignty and proprietorship in its territorial waters.
37. 339 U.S. at 719.
38. H.R. MIN. REP. on H.R. 4198, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), as reported in 2 U.S. CODE
CoNe. & An. NEws, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1465 (1953). Known offshore reserves at that date were
214 million barrels. Id. The price of crude oil being $2.50 per barrel, monetary figures approaching $38 billion were being considered as upper limits on the value of our offshore oil
reserves. Id.
39. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE ROLE OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS FROM THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL

SHELF IN THE NATIONAL

SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM

AND

NATURAL GAS 49

(Technical Bulletin 5, 1970) [hereinafter cited as DEI'T OF TIE INTERIOR BULLETIN]. This figure
"'could account for about 23.5% of the total estimated potential crude oil reserves within the
United States, within economic and technological reach." Id. (citation omitted).
40. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1975, at 57, col. 1. Senator Jackson, Chairman of the Senate
Interior Committee, predicted in June 1975 that the price of refined oil might rise as high as
$18.40 per barrel. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
41. S.REP. No.93-1116, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1974); DIEP'T OF THE INTERIOR BULLETIN at
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duced by a lessee of the United States Government. 42 As an example of the
amount of revenue a state might receive from such royalty payments, consider
Louisiana, whose offshore crude oil reserves produced an estimated 347.540
million barrels in 1967.43 Assuming, conservatively, that in 1975 Louisiana's
offshore production of oil equals that of 19674 the state would be due a
royalty payment of 5672.045 million for that one year alone. 45 Other resources
of substantial economic value are appropriated from the offshore submerged
lands. Total known natural gas reserves in this region are reported to be 34.2
trillion cubic feet. 46 Minerals such as manganese, ferromanganese, nickel, copper, cobalt,47 and sulfur 4s are known to exist in the offshore seabed. The value
of such minerals is great 49 as would be the royalties collectible upon their extraction. 0 The instant case presented the Court with the issue of state versus
federal ownership of such reserves for the first time since it adjudicated the
Louisiana and Texas controversies in 1950; in view of the discoveries in the
offshore seabed in the intervening 25 years, 5 - the instant defendants had more
than a philosophical interest in its outcome.5 2
In the principal case the Court relied upon its reasoning in California and
found historically erroneous the proposition that the original thirteen colonies
had "owned" the waters contiguous to their shores. 53 The defendant states
42. A copy of a sample oil and gas lease of submerged lands in the outer continental
shelf in use as of April, 1974, is printed in S. REP., supra note 42, at 57-61.
43. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR BULLETIN at 209, Table 5.
44.

Id.

45. This amount was calculated by multiplying 347.540 million barrels by $11.60 per
barrel times the 16.67o royalty rate.
46. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR BULLETIN at 18. Actual production in 1967 amounted to 1.797
trillion cubic feet. Id. Potential natural gas reserves are estimated at over 778 trillion cubic
feet. Id. at 125. The United States Government collects royalties equivalent to those assessed
on producers of crude oil. Id. at 198.
47. S.REP., supra note 42, at 66.
48. S. REP. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) (Minority views), as reported in 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1541 (1953); 95 S.Ct. at 1162.
49. "As of February 1, 1974, the market value of these materials would be:
$206,250,000
Manganese metal @ 37 1/40 per lb., total
40,000,000
Ferromanganese @ $194.50 per short ton
40,500,000
Nickel metal @ $1.62 per lb.
10,200,000
Copper metal @ 680 per lb.
15,500,000"
Cobalt metal @ $3.10 per lb.
S. RE., supra note 42, at 66.
50. "The contribution of a seabed hard minerals industry to the United States balance of
payments ... could, under the assumption of price, quantity, and usage described above, be
in the neighborhood of $425,000,000 per year by 1980." Id. at 67.
51. See text accompanying notes 38-51 supra.
52. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1778, supra note 20, at 1431: "The only reason advanced
by the Federal officials who advocate ... [Federal control over the marginal sea] is their desire for Federal management of the production of oil. It is noteworthy that the controversy
had its inception in 1937 by reason of the Federal departments' attempt to secure congressional sanction of their plans to assume control of the oil fields off the California coast....
In their testimony the representatives of the Federal department hi.ye 4dmitted hkt they are

not interested in anything but the oil." Id. at 1431.
53. See text accompanying note 24 supra,
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could not rely on such a legacy in support of their claim; rather, it was the
federal government which first asserted dominion over the waters contiguous
to the states' coastlines. 54 'The Court held its ruling in Louisiana to be controlling with respect to waters beyond the traditional three-mile belt of the
territorial sea. Those were the waters in which the instant defendants claimed
to have rights of proprietorship. Significantly, the Atlantic coastal states did
not assert governmental rights inherent in political sovereignity over such
waters. s5 Instead, the defendant states' answer to the complaint of the federal
government denied only the proprietaryrights of the United States in the seabed in the area beyond the three-mile marginal sea.5 6 The states considered any
interference with their proprietary rights in this seabed to be a violation of the
tenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. 57 In effect, the defendant states
accepted the Court's reasoning that "[p]rotection and control of the area are
...functions of national sovereignty," 5' 8 while at the same time asserting their
own claims to the corporeal elements beneath the sea.
Those who advocate federal dominance over such proprietary interests
point to the large amounts of money involved. 59 They argue that were the individual states to determine the extent and manner in which the resources
beneath the sea are to be appropriated, immeasurable harm to national commerce could result. Foreign nations and investment companies would hesitate
to engage in trade along the American seacoasts due to the multifarious and
inconsistent regulations and procedures that would apply to them while in
the waters under the control of different states. The standards for oil wells and
drilling apparatus would differ every few hundred miles along the coast. Considering the great importance of oil and other energy producing resources in
today's economy, it is argued that even a small decline in investment or production could have drastic consequences for our national economy.
Effective arguments exist to counter these propositions. First, the domestic
discontent following the California,Louisiana, and Texas decisions caused the

54.

95 S. Ct. at 1158. For a contrary interpretation, see note 27 supra. Cf. Comment, supra

note 25: "[W]hile international jurists have not distinguished control over the marginal belt
from ownership in it, the claim of nations for the limited purposes for which a belt has been
recognized have been conceived with the former in view." Id. at 366.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 1157.
56. Id. Louisiana used the same argument in her answer to the plaintiff's complaint in
United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950). See vom Baur, supra note 20, at 302 n.58.
57. 95 S. Ct. at 1157. See note 13 supra. The defendant states also propounded such affirmative defenses as estoppel and laches, claiming that the federal government has consistently recognized the states' title to the submerged lands in question and therefore should

not be heard at this late date to deny such acquiescence in state dominion.
58. 95 S.Ct. at 1158, quoting 339 U.S. at 704. Cf. Comment, supra note 25: "Granting the
principle that the defense of American rights in these lands [under the marginal sea] against
possible claims of other nations is an attribute of 'external sovereignty' vested in the federal
government rather than the states, it does not necessarily follow that ownership, too, vests in
the Federal Government. It would be as logical to say that to exercise its powers of national
defense or of regulation of commerce, the Federal Government needed a proprietary interest
in the whole country." Id. at 364 (citation omitted).
59. See text accompanying notes 38-51 supra.
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elected representatives in Congress to pass the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,60
which, as the instant Court notes,G1 "grant[s] to the riparian states rights to
the resources of the federal area [within the three-mile belt] subject to the
reservation by the federal government of its rights and powers of regulation
and control for [the] purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense and
international affairs."6 2 These rights and powers statutorily reserved to the
federal government are precisely those that the instant Court regards as being
impossible to reconcile with the states' exercise of proprietary rights in the
area beyond the three-mile belt. Yet for over 20 years the states have been collecting the royalties from the resources discovered within the three-mile belt
without interfering with the federal government's exercise of its regulatory
powers. Certainly the same arrangement could operate just as effectively in the
area beyond the three-mile belt. In other words, today the states exercise
proprietary rights in the three-mile belt while leaving to the federal government all matters of regulation, including those involving the standards to be
imposed on oil wells and drilling apparatus. This arrangement was necessitated
by the Court's decision in California that national concerns predominate in
the three-mile belt. The operation of the Submerged Lands Act in this area
has proven that federal regulation and state proprietorship can exist side by
side. It is, therefore, logically inconsistent for the instant Court to conclude as
a matter of law s that state proprietorship precludes the effective operation of
federal regulation in the area beyond the three-mile belt.
Second, the national interests that are appurtenant to the mineral and oil
deposits beneath the ocean seabed should equally prevail when one considers
such deposits found beneath the ground. The individual states regulate the
mining and production of such resources, and it cannot be doubted that oil
pumped from wells in Texas is just as crucial to our national economy as that
discovered in offshore deposits. Foreign entities invest in land-based enterprises
within the borders of numerous states. Yet their inconvenience has not occasioned the federal government to assert proprietary dominance over the resources developed from inland deposits. 4
The Court in the instant case ignores the considerations herein outlined. It
attempts to refute the states' claims to a proprietary interest in the seabed by
restating the uncontested point that the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction in areas of foreign commerce, foreign affairs, and national defense.65
The unanimous Court 6 concludes that "as attributes of these external soy60. 95 S. Ct. at 1160. See note 2 supra. See also Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of
1953, 43 U.S.C. §1331 (1965).
61. 95 S. Ct. at 1160, quoting Special Master's Report at 16.
62. Id.

63. The Court's decision did not contemplate the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, see
note 60 supra, which reserved to the federal government rights to the resources in the submerged lands beyond the territorial seas of the states.
64. The federal government would be hard pressed to make such an argument in light of
the consistent holdings of the Supreme Court that such inland deposits are under the exclusive sovereignty of the'states. See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
65.

95 S. Ct. at 1159, quoting Special Master'sReport at 23.

66. Justice Douglas did not participate in the adjudication of the instant case.
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